On April 2, 2010, Kevin Kelly – founding executive editor of Wired magazine – wrote an article centered around this exact line, which he referred to as the Shirky Principle.

The Shirky Principle declares that complex solutions (like a company, or an industry) can become so dedicated to the problem they are the solution to, that often they inadvertently perpetuate the problem.

That said, Kelly believed unions perfectly exemplified the Shirky Principle as evidenced by the text below:

Unions were a brilliant solution to the problem of capital management which tended to exploit uncapitalized workers. But over time as capital increased in complexity, unions complexified as well, until unions needed management. The two became one system -- union/management. So now the problem with unions is that they are locked into the old framework, the old system.

(See: Article 10)

(See: Article 12)

(See: Article 11)

(See: Article 1)

This article seeks to prohibit judges from abusing their discretionary power by issuing punishments that were outside the bounds of the law or disproportionate to the crime.

The idea of bail had a long history in England. A form of bail was used in ancient Anglo-Saxon times. This article reflects a desire to limit judges from setting excessive bail amounts. The bail should not be so high as to effectively deny someone the right of bail. In other words, the bail amount should not be set so high as to prevent an individual from paying it. Likewise, fines should not be so high as to bring about an individual’s financial ruin.

Note: “Sever and unusual” in seventeenth century meaning of the language actually meant “severe and uncommon.” For example, it was considered appropriate punishment both before and after the Bill of Rights to hang, draw, and quarter an individual convicted of a very serious crime such as treason. It would be considered “severe and uncommon,” however, to draw and quarter someone for perjury, although whipping might be in order.

After a person was convicted of treason, not only could he be hung, drawn, and quartered, but also his property could be taken by the king through “fines and forfeitures.” This property could then be given by the king as a gift to one of his courtiers, friends, or allies.

It became common for kings in treason cases to promise these “fines or forfeitures” to someone else even before the conviction was made. The potential beneficiaries of these promised rewards, who were often powerful people, might try to influence the case and press for a conviction. The person granted the gift would in effect turn prosecutor. This type of corruption was the cause of widespread resentment towards the monarchy during the decades leading up to the Glorious Revolution.

“Freeholders” owned property and had the right to sell it at their will. Property ownership was much more rare in seventeenth century England than it is in modern day America, and it was usually an indication of substantial wealth. It was generally accepted by the ruling classes that freeholders made better jurors than leaseholders (renters) who were generally poor and thus more prone to be swayed by bribes or other influences. This article specifies that for treason trials only freeholders should serve as the jurors and that they should be returned to their lives as soon as possible.

Freeholders were more numerous in rural areas where land was relatively cheap. Since treason trials were often held in an urban environment – namely London – freeholders were harder to come by and less likely to serve on juries unless a concerted effort was made to find them.

This article reaffirms an old and well-established principle going back to the The Magna Carta that the people should not be taxed without their consent. Before the Bill of Rights, however, there were exceptions to this age-old principle. For centuries, Parliament, which claimed to be “the representative body of the people,” officially had the power only over “direct” taxes such as those on land. Monarchs could tax without Parliament’s permission by levying “indirect” taxes such as customs duties. They sometimes also engaged in “forced borrowing,” borrowing money from wealthy subjects against their will and, in some instances, refusing to return it. This method of raising money was also done without the permission of Parliament.

This article clearly spells out that there should be no taxation by the king without Parliament’s consent.

The principle behind this article later became central to the cause of American colonists in the lead-up to the American Revolution, even though the wording of the article itself worked against them. Since the colonists elected no members to Parliament, they felt that Parliament did not represent them. Therefore, even if a tax imposed on the colonies had the consent of Parliament, it was still fundamentally unfair. Members of Parliament argued that the Parliament did in fact represent the colonists, as they were British subjects. American patriots, however, did not accept this argument and “no taxation without representation” became their rallying cry.

This was an attack on the Ecclesiastical Commission: a body James II established in order to supervise and control the Anglican Church of England and the English university system.

This body was unpopular, especially with Anglican Tories, because it punished church officials and college faculty who were hostile to Catholicism, while at the same time promoting Catholics to important positions. This article effectively limited the king’s control over state-run churches and universities.

(Pictured above: Some Tories riding horseback during a fox hunt)